“Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2000
“Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive
contracts
Ewerhart, C; Schmitz, P W
Ewerhart, C; Schmitz, P W (2000). “Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts. Journal of
Economic Behavior &amp; Organization, 43(1):115-125.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization 2000, 43(1):115-125.
Ewerhart, C; Schmitz, P W (2000). “Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts. Journal of
Economic Behavior &amp; Organization, 43(1):115-125.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization 2000, 43(1):115-125.
“Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive
contracts
Abstract
In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes man” behavior in
organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757-770] argued that incentive
contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired
information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort
and inducing him to tell the truth. In contrast, we show that with optimally designed contracts, which we
term integrity contracts, the worker will both exert effort and report his information truthfully, and
hence the first best can be achieved.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the standard principal agent model has been
fruitfully extended in a number of dimensions.3 One of the more recent de-
velopments of this literature relates to incentive problems connected with the
acquisition and transmission of information in organizations.4 More specif-
ically, in an approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes
man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) has argued that con-
tracts cannot induce a worker to both exert costly e¤ort on an information
gathering activity and subsequently reveal his privately acquired informa-
tion. This implies that the …rst best cannot be achieved, even though the
actors are risk-neutral and there are no rents due to wealth constraints or
pre-contractual private information. The basic idea underlying the argument
is the following. In order to induce the worker to exert e¤ort, the manager
will have to use an incentive scheme that is based on an (imperfect) measure
of the e¤ort level chosen by the worker. The manager will therefore compare
her own information with the worker’s report and pay him accordingly. Now,
if the worker observes, in addition to his valuable information, a signal on
the manager’s information, then the incentive scheme induces the worker to
behave as a “yes man”, i.e., he will use his second signal (which contains no
new information on the true parameter) in order to bias his report towards
his estimate of the manager’s signal.
In this paper we argue that the “yes man” phenomenon, rather than be-
ing a necessary feature of relationships between managers and subordinates,
is a consequence of suboptimal contract design. We will show that there are
simple contracts which make the worker both reveal his private information
and exert the …rst-best level of e¤ort. We …nd that this result is interesting
for at least four reasons. First, we stay within the contractibility assumptions
of Prendergast’s (1993) original model.5 Next, although the manager’s signal
3Cf. Hart and Holmström (1987) and Salanié (1997).
4See Aghion and Tirole (1997), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998), Dewatripont and
Tirole (1998), Levitt and Snyder (1995), Lewis and Sappington (1997), and Shavell (1994).
Cf. also Hermalin (1998) and the literature cited there.
5This is in contrast to a series of recent papers that prove …rst-best results by modifying
the set of assumptions in existing models. For instance, Chung (1991), Rogerson (1992),
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is statistically su¢cient for the worker’s second signal, we argue that never-
theless the second signal is still valuable for the manager. This runs counter
the intuition that it is su¢cient to ask the worker to report his useful signal
only (cf. Holmström, 1979). Moreover, our main result is in accordance with
a recent strand of management literature that argues in favor of supporting
ethically sound behavior (see e.g. Paine, 1994) via top management direc-
tives. Finally, the view taken in this paper is also supported by the fact that
in the 90’s an increasing number of businesses started to implement guiding
principles for their work force focussing on values like honesty and integrity,
both within the …rm and in relation with customers.6
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section,
the basic model is introduced. In section 3 we formally show how the …rst best
can be achieved by an integrity contract. The results are further discussed
in section 4. Section 5 concludes. Some technical arguments have been
relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
We present a slightly simpli…ed version of Prendergast’s (1993) model which
is su¢cient to make the point.7 Assume that there are two risk-neutral
individuals called manager and worker. The manager is responsible for a
long-term project, the result of which depends on how precise her pre-project
estimate of an uncertain parameter ´ will be. Speci…cally, it is assumed that
the expected value of the project’s long-term return accruing to the manager
Hermalin and Katz (1993), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Nöldeke and Schmidt
(1995), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that the …rst
best can be achieved in the framework of Rogerson (1984) and Hart and Moore (1988).
6E.g., in 1996 the General Motors Board of Directors wrote “This company will have
a successful and enduring life – earned by the value of its products and services, and
the integrity of its people.” Cf. General Motors (1999). See also Shell (1999): “Shell
companies insist on honesty, integrity and fairness in all aspects of their business and
expect the same in their relationships with all those with whom they do business.”
7The simpli…cation is that in our model the variance of the manager’s signal will be
exogenously given. Giving the manager the possibility to reduce this variance by exerting
e¤ort complicates the exposition but does not change the economic insights.
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(after a suitable normalization) is equal to the negative of the variance of the
manager’s estimate of ´. The joint prior of both manager and worker on ´
is taken to be identical to the actual distribution of the parameter, which is
assumed to be normal with mean ´0 and variance ¾
2
0 > 0. At the moment
when the manager takes up her task she receives a veri…able signal8
´m = ´ + "m;
where "m denotes a normally distributed error with mean 0 and variance
¾2m > 0: The manager is given the option to employ the worker for the task
of gathering additional information. When being hired by the manager, the
worker can generate a private signal
´w = ´ + "w;
where "w is a normally distributed error term with mean 0. The precision
of the worker’s private signal is assumed to depend on how much e¤ort he
invests in the information gathering activity. For a worker exerting e¤ort
e ¸ 0, let C(e) denote his cost of e¤ort, and ¾2w = h(e) the resulting variance
of the error term "w. Assume that C(e) is continuously di¤erentiable for
nonnegative e¤ort levels and that C 0 (e) is nonnegative, strictly increasing,
and unbounded from above with C 0(0) = 0. Assume also that h(e) is con-
tinuously di¤erentiable for nonnegative e¤ort levels and that h0(e) is strictly
negative and strictly increasing. Finally, it is assumed that the worker also
privately observes a signal on what the manager has seen,
´¸ = ´m + ¸;
where ¸ is a normally distributed error with mean 0 and variance ¾2¸; where
0 < ¾2¸ <1:9
As a benchmark, consider the …rst-best solution, which requires C(e) +
V ar[´j´m; ´w] to be minimized. In a perfect world, the worker reports his
8This signal may be interpreted as a documentation that comprises the factors that
eventually led to the initiation of the project. If the manager’s signal were not veri…able,
no e¤ort could ever be induced.
9The random variables ´; "m; "w; and ¸ are assumed to be uncorrelated.
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private information ´w truthfully.
10 Given a certain e¤ort level e, the condi-
tional variance of the manager’s posterior distribution of ´ given ´m and ´w
reads
V ¤ =
¾2w¾
2
m¾
2
0
¾2m¾
2
0 + ¾2m¾
2
w + ¾
2
0¾2w
:
Thus, under the assumptions made, there exists an e¢cient e¤ort level e¤ >
0.11 The necessary …rst-order condition is given by
C 0(e¤) = ¡h0(e¤) [¾
2
0¾
2
m]
2
[¾20¾
2
m + ¾
2
m¾
2
w + ¾
2
w¾
2
0]
2
.
3 The …rst best is achievable
Under second-best conditions, i.e., if neither e¤ort nor long-term return is
contractible, the manager may want to induce the worker to exert e¤ort by
o¤ering suitable monetary incentives. Prendergast (1993) assumes that the
manager measures the worker’s performance by comparing the information
that is available to her with a veri…able message b´w to be sent by the worker.
He shows that if the worker is induced to exert strictly positive e¤ort, then
he does not report ´w honestly, yielding a variance of the manager’s estimate
of ´ which is strictly higher than V ¤. This implies that either the induced
e¤ort level or the precision of the manager’s estimate must be suboptimal.
10Note that ´m is statistically su¢cient for ´¸; so that the worker does not need to
report ´¸ in a …rst-best world.
11To see this, note that total costs are continuous on [0;1[ and that
lim
e!1C(e) + V
¤(e) =1;
by the assumptions made on C(:) and by V ¤(:) > 0. Notice that in general the second-
order condition, which requires convexity of the total cost function C(e) + V ¤(e) with
respect to e; need not be satis…ed. In fact, V ¤(:) is convex in e if and only if
h00(e) ¸ 2[h
0(e)]2
c+ h(e)
;
for all e > 0, where c = ¾20¾
2
m=(¾
2
0 + ¾
2
m). Hence, if e.g. h(e) = ¾
2
w exp(¡e), then for
c < ¾2w, the function V
¤(:) is strictly convex in the non-empty interval ]j ln(c=¾2w)j;1[;
but strictly concave in the non-empty interval ]0; j ln(c=¾2w)j[.
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We shall now describe a contract that implements the …rst best. The
contract says that the worker has to make a report consisting of two parts,e´w and e´m: In the …rst part of the report, the worker is asked to reveal his
valuable signal ´w: In the second part of the report, the worker is asked
to announce his best estimate for the manager’s information ´m: Then the
worker is paid solely on the basis of the second part of his report. Speci…cally,
the worker receives an amount w1 if je´m¡´mj < k and w0 otherwise, for some
constant k. We will refer to such contracts as integrity contracts. Note that
an integrity contract is completely speci…ed by the tupel (w0; w1; k).
While explicit integrity contracts may not be frequently observed in the
real world in a literal sense, they may actually be quite common in implicit
contracting. For example, it is common practice for political and economic
advisors to structure their written reports for political decision makers in one
part that contains the facts and another part in which conclusions and rec-
ommendations are derived. Although both parts of the report are required,
the political leader typically assesses the advisor by how close the conclu-
sions are to her gut feeling rather than by the details of the analysis. An
advisor coming up with conclusions similar to the ones the political leader
had derived alone thereby may gain a higher probability of being employed
again in the future.12
The following simple observation is the key to the main result of this
paper.
Observation: A worker working under the terms of an integrity contract
will truthfully reveal his acquired information in the …rst part of the report.
To see this, recall that in the given setting the worker does not have an
intrinsic interest in the decision to be made by the manager. Rather, it is
the worker’s objective to maximize his expected wage. Since the contractual
wage in an integrity contract does not depend on the …rst part of the report
(but regularly on the second), the worker is indi¤erent between reporting
the truth and lying when announcing ~´w, so that it is rational for him to
12In an alternative interpretation, a supervisor, rather than asking his subordinate for
his opinion on a speci…c issue, would ask him two questions: “What do you think is my
opinion on this matter” and afterwards “And, be honest, what is your own opinion?”.
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truthfully reveal ´w.
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The fact that integrity contracts are consistent with honest revelation
of the worker’s valuable information allows to resolve the tension between
inducing the worker to exert e¤ort and encouraging him to reveal his acquired
information. This is the content of the following result.
Theorem 1 There exists an integrity contract which implements the …rst
best.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, it is su¢cient to show that there
always exists an integrity contract (w0; w1; k) inducing the worker to exert
e¤ort e¤ > 0: If such a contract exists, then the …rst best can be achieved,
because the worker has no incentive to distort the information in the …rst
part of his report, as has been argued above.
We solve the worker’s remaining decision problem (the choice of the e¤ort
level and the second part of the report) in two steps. First, assume that e¤ort
e has been chosen and ´w and ´¸ are realized. Then the worker maximizes
his interim net expected payo¤
w0 + [prob(je´m ¡ ´mj < kj´w; ´¸)](w1 ¡ w0)
by choice of e´m = e´m(e; ´w; ´¸). One can check that the worker’s interim
belief over the random variable ´m is normally distributed with mean M =
¹0´w + ¹1´0 + ¹2´¸, where the parameters are de…ned as
¹0 =
¾20¾
2
¸
¾20¾2w + ¾
2
0¾2m + ¾
2
w¾
2
m + ¾
2
¸[¾
2
w + ¾
2
0]
¹1 =
¾2w¾
2
¸
¾20¾
2
w + ¾
2
0¾
2
m + ¾
2
w¾
2
m + ¾
2
¸[¾
2
w + ¾
2
0]
¹2 =
¾20¾
2
w + ¾
2
0¾
2
m + ¾
2
w¾
2
m
¾20¾
2
w + ¾
2
0¾
2
m + ¾
2
w¾
2
m + ¾
2
¸[¾
2
w + ¾
2
0]
:
13We hence follow Prendergast (1993, p. 764) and the main-stream principal-agent
literature (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart 1983, p. 22) in assuming that the worker, when
indi¤erent between any two optimal choices, chooses the one that is preferred by the
principal. If the worker has arbitrary small but positive costs of lying (e.g., due to scruples
or to faking pieces of evidence), he even strictly prefers to tell the truth.
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For a given k > 0, the term prob(je´m¡´mj < kj´w; ´¸) (which will in general
depend on e) is the integral of the density function f of the worker’s interim
belief on ´m over the interval [e´m ¡ k; e´m + k]. Hence, as the Gauss density
f is symmetric with respect to its mean M , strictly increasing left from M ,
and strictly decreasing right from M , the term prob(je´m ¡ ´mj < kj´w; ´¸)
is strictly increasing for e´m < M and strictly decreasing for e´m > M . Thus,
given a positive wage di¤erence w1 ¡ w0; the worker chooses e´m(e; ´w; ´¸) =
M .
Next, consider the worker’s choice of the e¤ort level. He maximizes
w0 + [prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)](w1 ¡ w0)¡ C(e):
Note that prob(jM¡´mj < k) is a continuously di¤erentiable function of ¾2w.
Hence the necessary …rst-order condition for the worker is given by
h0(e)
@prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)
@¾2w
(w1 ¡ w0) = C 0(e):
The …rst-order condition becomes su¢cient if the associated second-order
condition "
h00(e)
@prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)
@¾2w
(1)
+[h0(e)]2
@2prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)
@¾2w@¾
2
w
#
(w1 ¡ w0)¡ C 00(e) < 0
holds. We show in Appendix A that there is a k such that the second-order
condition holds for any positive wage di¤erential w1 ¡w0, and for any e¤ort
level e > 0. Then, since C 0(e¤) > 0 and h0(e¤) < 0 by assumption, and since
@prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)
@¾2w
= ¡ kp
2¼¾3
exp(¡ k
2
2¾2
)¹20 < 0 (2)
(see Appendix B), where ¾2 =Var(M ¡ ´m), there exists a (unique) positive
wage di¤erence w1 ¡ w0 such that the …rst-order condition holds for the
e¢cient e¤ort level e¤. Hence, there is an integrity contract (w0; w1; k) that
induces the worker to choose e¤, which proves the theorem.
To understand how e¢ciency can be guaranteed, recall …rst that the man-
ager receives the full information from the worker under an integrity contract.
8
Thus, when using integrity contracts, the manager’s marginal revenue from
implementing a higher e¤ort level is the same as if the information of the
worker was publicly observable. Also, as the worker does not earn any rent
and is solely reimbursed for his cost, the marginal costs of implementing a
higher e¤ort level for the principal are equal to the social costs. Thus, since
the principal earns the social revenue and carries the social costs from a
given e¤ort level, he will prefer the …rst-best e¤ort level e¤ over any other
implementable e¤ort level.
While some technical work is necessary to provide a formal proof, it is
intuitively clear that the worker can be induced to exert the e¢cient e¤ort
e¤. To see why, note that under an integrity contract the worker has an
interest to improve his information about the manager’s signal. Yet, the
only way to improve this information is by exerting e¤ort directed towards
an improvement of his information about the true state of the world. Hence,
by a suitable choice of incentives (i.e. of w1¡w0) the worker can be induced,
via this external e¤ect, to ‘abuse’ his technology to produce a higher accuracy
of the valuable information.14
From a contract-theoretic point of view, it is interesting to note that ask-
ing the worker to make two announcements can be welfare-improving, even
though the manager’s own signal is statistically su¢cient for the worker’s
second signal. The reason is that the second part of the report is needed
as a basis for the worker’s compensation which must be designed in order
to provide e¤ort incentives, while the …rst part is needed in order to elicit
the worker’s unbiased opinion.15 In contrast, Prendergast (1993) consid-
ers contracts which ask the seller to make only one announcement. As the
14It is interesting to note that although the worker’s payment is not directly contingent
on his announcement e´w, it may nevertheless a¤ect equilibrium behavior. The reason is
that, since the information transmission becomes e¢cient, the additional announcement
changes the principal’s revenue resulting from the worker’s e¤ort, so that another e¤ort
level is implemented.
15In order to implement the …rst best, it is important that the worker’s expected payment
depends only on the second but not on the …rst part of his report. Otherwise, the worker
might …nd it in his interest to misrepresent the information in the …rst part of his report.
If the principal is then unable to track back what the true information must have been,
information transmission is ine¢cient so that the parties fail to achieve the …rst best.
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implementation of the …rst-best level of e¤ort e¤ > 0 would require strict
incentives (meaning w1 > w0) to induce the worker to exert positive e¤ort,
the same incentives would make the worker distort his information. By sep-
arating the information channel enabling incentives for e¤ort exertion from
that transmitting the valuable information, the dilemma can be resolved.16
4 Discussion
Four features of the present framework are essential to derive the e¢ciency
result.
Absence of insider concerns: The worker in the model is not interested
in the outcome of the decision to be made by the manager. Relaxing this
assumption must be expected to have serious consequences on e¢ciency since
it will become more di¢cult to elicit the information of the worker. Consider,
e.g., a division head in a business enterprise reporting to an o¢cer. If the
o¢cer’s discretion encompasses, say, the budget of the division, it will be
more likely that the division head distorts information that will a¤ect the
o¢cer’s budgetary decisions.
Exclusion of rent-seeking possibilities: The …rst best may not be reached if
the parties can spend socially spurious e¤ort in order to increase their income.
For example, the worker could have the possibility to improve the precision
of his second signal, ´¸; by investing a positive amount in a second e¤ort
variable e¸.17 In that case, the worker may be encouraged to …rst search for
and then conform to the supervisor’s views.18 If the cost of a marginal e¤ort
for searching for the manager’s signal is su¢ciently low, then the worker will
invest e¸ > 0 which is clearly ine¢cient as this e¤ort generates an additional
cost without revealing any valuable information.
16Note that while our result is basically positive since it shows that the …rst best can
be achieved, it can also be interpreted to be negative because it contradicts Prendergast’s
(1993, p. 764) explanation of why in some circumstances …rms may prefer not to o¤er
incentive pay to workers. In the present model, low-powered (‡at) wage schemes can never
be optimal if the class of contracts is not restricted.
17See also Prendergast (1993, p. 760).
18This is a well-known phenomenon in the literature on so-called leader-member ex-
changes. See Deluga and Perry (1994, p. 81).
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Absence of rents for the worker: In the current setting, the worker earns
no rent in a contractual relationship compared to his outside option. The
…rst best may not be attainable if the worker earns a positive rent. For
example, if the worker has limited liability (i.e., w0 ¸ 0), his contractual rent
may vary with the e¤ort level. Hence, for the manager the marginal cost
of implementing a given e¤ort level may be di¤erent with limited liability
when compared to the original setting. Thus, the manager may …nd it in her
interest to implement an e¤ort level di¤erent from e¤, so that a social loss may
result. Similar arguments apply when the worker earns a rent because of risk-
aversion, where the worker has to be reimbursed for the risk he faces under
a variable wage contract. Finally, the worker may earn rents from missing
markets at the stage of contracting (e.g. due to asymmetric information),
again potentially with negative e¤ects on welfare.
Complete contracts: When compared to Prendergast’s (1993) ine¢ciency
result, Theorem 1 shows that “yes man” behavior may be a consequence of
exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible contracts. One of the reasons for
the exclusion of integrity contract could be the potentially higher contracting
costs (e.g., due to a higher complexity). However, the exact nature of such
restrictions remains unclear, so that further research on these issues would
be desirable.19
Given our result, it seems natural to ask to what extent the “yes man”
problem can be mitigated by more sophisticated contract design. Beside the
type of contract discussed in this paper we give three, as we think, important
examples for organizational design that can improve e¢ciency of information
acquisition and transmission in organizations.
Delegation: Ine¢ciencies in information acquisition and transmission may
be reduced by the delegation of decisions. However, the gain from avoiding
ine¢ciencies from the distortion of information (and the gain from possibly
better incentives to search for information on the part of the worker) must
be traded for the loss from a potentially suboptimal decision.20
Advocacy: To avoid the “yes man” problem, supervisors may want to ac-
19For a recent discussion of incomplete contracting, see Tirole (1999). Cf. also Grossman
and Hart (1986).
20For a thorough discussion, cf. Aghion and Tirole (1997).
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tively reward open inquiry and meticulous evaluation of their own proposals.
Subordinates could be required to criticize a supervisor’s proposed course
of action by identifying potential ‡aws, presenting worst case outcomes, and
suggesting alternative ideas.21 In one-dimensional con‡icts, the manager may
even want to assign certain roles to her subordinates, who are then rewarded
for evidence that supports only one extreme position.22
Third Parties: The involvement of an independent agent is a natural
measure for mitigating “yes man” behavior. In the o¢cer – division head
example, typically part of the information would be acquired by a third
party (such as a controlling department or an independent advisor) that
may possess less information than the division head but that can be given
incentives to report truthfully.
5 Conclusion
The model of Prendergast (1993) was designed to pinpoint ine¢ciencies in
organizations resulting from the misrepresentation of information under in-
centive contracts. In this paper we have shown that these ine¢ciencies can
be avoided and that the …rst best can be achieved by using simple integrity
contracts that give agents a chance to be honest without hurting themselves.
One essential assumption in Prendergast’s original framework that allows
to derive this result is that the worker has no personal interest in the decision
to be made by the manager. Since we would expect that a worker in an
organization is not completely indi¤erent about the decisions made by his
supervisor (in particular if these decisions concern his professional career),
we …nd it more convincing to interpret Prendergast’s “worker” as an outsider
to the organization such as an economic or political advisor who is asked to
write an independent report.
Fruitful future research on this topic may hence include the analysis of
“yes man” behavior of a subordinate who has non-trivial preferences regard-
ing the decisions to be made by his supervisor.
21Cf. Deluga and Perry (1994) and the literature cited there.
22See Dewatripont and Tirole (1998).
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6 Appendix
A. There exists a k such that the second-order condition (1) holds.
We show that for a su¢ciently high k, the term in square brackets in the
second-order condition (1) is negative for any e > 0. Since h00(e) > 0 by
assumption and @prob(jM¡´mj<k)
@¾2w
< 0 (see Appendix B), it su¢ces to show
that prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k) is strictly concave with respect to ¾2w. We will
analyze the term
@2prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)
@¾2w@¾
2
w
=
k
2
p
2¼¾7N
exp(¡ k
2
2¾2
)¹20
h
(3¾2 ¡ k2)¹20N + 4¾4(¾20 + ¾2m + ¾2¸)
i
as a function of ¾2w, where N = ¾
2
0¾
2
w + ¾
2
0¾
2
m + ¾
2
w¾
2
m + ¾
2
¸[¾
2
w + ¾
2
0]. Note
…rst that
¾2 = ¹21¾
2
0 + ¹
2
0¾
2
w + (¹2 ¡ 1)2¾2m + ¹22¾2¸:
Clearly, for a given triple of positive ¾20; ¾
2
m; ¾
2
¸ < 1, ¾2 is bounded from
above since ¾2w = h(e) < h(0) < 1, and since the parameters ¹0; ¹1; and
¹2 lie in ]0; 1[. On the other hand, the term ¹
2
0N is bounded from below since
¾2w is bounded from above. Hence, for any su¢ciently high k, the function
prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k) is strictly concave with respect to ¾2w.
B. Proof of (2).
We calculate the …rst derivative of prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k) with respect to ¾2w.
Recall that M = ¹0´w + ¹1´0 + ¹2´¸. Hence » = M ¡ ´m is normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance
¾2 = ¹21¾
2
0 + ¹
2
0¾
2
w + (¹2 ¡ 1)2¾2m + ¹22¾2¸:
A short calculation shows that then @¾2=@¾2w = ¹
2
0. Hence, by the de…nition
of the derivative and by Leibnitz’s rule,
@prob(jM ¡ ´mj < k)
@¾2w
= ¹20
@prob(j»j < k)
@¾2
=
¹20
¾2
@prob(j»j < k)
@ ln ¾2
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=
¹20
¾2
lim
"!0
1
"
8<:
Z +k
¡k
1q
2¼¾2 exp(")
exp
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